Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

State of Utah v. James Lewis Green : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Barbara Bearnson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Daniel R. Knowlton; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. James Lewis Green, No. 890222 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1788

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Dfitcr

UTAH
DOCUMENT
K FU
50
.AiO
DOCKET H'J.

JtM^THftJJTAEl COURT OF APPEALS

STATE ::!* '""H'AIf,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs .

Case No, 3Q("r°? ri\
JAMES LEWIS GREEN, AKA
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS,

Cat eg THI

n

Ueieiidant-Appel l a n t .
REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from final judgment and sentence of the First Judicial
District Court in and for SOK Elder County, State of Utah,
Honorable GORDON J, LOW, Judge.- Presiding.

DANIZ:

KNOWLTC::

214 Tenth Avenue
Salt Lake ~;*:y vt.
Te 1 ?TDh ^n e *
?

°" " '

» ^ Q _ O r\ *> r

;^..

-.*. ^ -11 ant

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
BARBARA BEARNSON
Assistant Attorney Genei il
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 M
Attorneys for Plaintiff-respondent

* p%

CUyst of n.f-1 ojrt

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,

]

vs.
>
]
]
>
]

JAMES LEWIS GREEN, AKA
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890222-CA
Category No. 2

REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from final judgment and sentence of the First Judicial
District Court in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah,
Honorable GORDON J. LOW, Judge, Presiding.

DANIEL R. KNOWLTON, USB NO. 5180
214 Tenth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-8025
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
BARBARA BEARNSON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities

x

Point I: THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT
WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL
SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
SEARCH WARRANT . ."
1
Point II: EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED
BASED ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING PARTY WAS A
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
5
BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT
Point III: THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE DEPRIVED
DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE
8
HIS DEFENSES
Points IV and V: THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERRING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AND IS A DEPRIVATION OF
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF PROSCRIBED
9
CONDUCT
Point VI: THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY
INSTRUCTION THAT THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE
PROPRIETY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TOBE-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County,
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)

10

State v. Adams, 583 P. 2d 89 (Utah, 1978)

7

State v. Anderton, 668 P. 2d 1258 (Utah 1983)

3

State v. Austria, 524 P. 2d 290 (Haw. 1974)

5

State v. Bailey 675 P2d 1203 (Utah, 1984)

'

.*

State v. Garcia, 566 P.2d 42 6 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977)

5

State v. GalJLion, 572 P. 2d 683 (Utah, 1977)
"

9,
14,

State v. King, 752 P. 2d 869 (Or. App. 1988)

4

State v. Louden, 387 P. 2d 240 (Utah 1963)

7

State v. Torrez, 544 P. 2d 207 (Ariz. 1975)

5

State v. Watts, 750 P. 2d 1219 (Utah 1988)

6

United States y. Craig, 674 F Supp 561 (WD La, 1987)... 3
U.S. v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988)
CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment, U.S. Constitution

4
7

STATUTES AND RULES
21 USCA 811(e)
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-2 (4) (Supp . 1988)

15

12,

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-2(16)

13

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-4

12

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (3)

13,

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent,

]

vs.
i
]
]
)
]

JAMES LEWIS GREEN, AKA
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890222-CA
Category No. 2

REPLY BRIEF
Defendant/Appellant responds only to certain issues raised
in Plaintiff/Appellee's brief.

Most matters were adequately

handled in Appellant's brief and will not be repeated here.
Point I: THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
THE SEARCH WARRANT.
The State cites State v. Bailey 675 P2d 1203, at 1205-6,
(1984) for the proposition that less proof of knowledge,
veracity, and reliability is required if the circumstances as a
whole indicate the informant's report is truthful.
circumstances as a whole indicate untruthfulness.

The
Bailey, at

1206, indicates some of the factors to be considered are
disinteredness, and whether the witness had anything to gain or
lose from the testimony.
suspicious.

Mr. Pommier's testimony was at best

He made a copy of a key he found (see Reporter's

Transcript of Motion to Supress, hereinafter "S", p. 108), with a

1

surreptitious intent (S 109). He broke into the garage six times
(S 114). It was almost a full year before he went to the police
to report this situation.

(Between July or August, 1987, when he

made the key copy (S 92) and June of 1988 when he finally spoke
to Officer Yeates (S 95)). Mr. Pommier testified he had a
"guilty conscience11 concerning this (S 95). Defendant testified
that he'd fired Pommier for taking money from Defendant's house
(S 140). This matter had been reiterated in June, also (S 141).
It must be considered how devastating such a charge against Mr.
Pommier would have been to his affiliation with the Fire
Department, his being Assistant Fire Marshal, or Acting Fire
Marshal (S 142)that is, unless he could bring charges against
Defendant first.

While the State asserts that Mr. Pommier

volunteered the information "with no claim for reward or legal
favor", it is more plausible, given what he'd admitted, that it
was done by Mr. Pommier, after such a long and secret delay, as a
defensive move, to seek legal favor in the event Mr. Douglas
actually brought charges against Mr. Pommier.
What should've been corrected in the Affidavit Requesting
Issuance of Search Warrant, and brought to the issuing judge's
attention were: (1) the falsity of the statement that "...Phenyl2-Propane...[is a]... control led substance[s]... under the Utah
Controlled Substance Act..." (page 5 of the Affidavit).

The

statement should said P-2-) is illegal under the Federal act, but
not listed under the State Act.

The judge did not have the

benefit of that key information, which was affirmatively
mistated.

(2)

The statement a "Clandestine-type" lab (page 2 of

Affidavit) existed aggravated that improper statement.

(3) The

fact that the previous owner of the house was a chemistry teacher
was not revealed.

Detective Johnson knew this (S 54), as did the

informant, Mr. Pommier (S 109), and it was not told to the
issuing judge, and should be read back into the Affidavit.

The

State argues such things as that it was learned at trial that
when the high school teacher sold the house, he left it empty.
There is no showing that either Johnson or Pommier knew this
constellation of facts, learned with "20-20 hindsight", and the
judge was entitled to know what Johnson and Pommier knew and
believed at the time, that is, that the previous owner was a high
school chemistry teacher.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons Mr.

Pommier himself waited almost a year before informing authorities
of the existence of the items.
The State responds to the staleness argument with the
statement that Appellant's cases are merely Federal cases.

In

the Affdavit, the informant is alleged to have "personally been
in the residence on numerous occasions between the dates of
January 1986 and April 22, 1988" (Affidavit, p. 3). United
States v. Craig, 674 F Supp 561 (WD La, 1987) provides sound
reason for a rule that when the affidavit describes a period of
time without specifying dates, the events must be presumed to
have occurred on the most remote dates.

Attempting to counter

this, the State cites State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah
1983).

However, in State v. Anderton, the court found the

affidavit was "couched in present tense language" (at 1261).
affidavit in our case predominates in the past tense.

The

The State

opines that an on-going criminal activity was described, but no
acts were cited supporting such an activity, other than the
existence of certain equipment and chemicals over more than a two
year period.

Appellant can find no statement in the Affidavit

that the equipment and chemicals were being used (other than
below), or were even so much as moved during the two-year
observation.

The lack of evidence of actions is perhaps proof no

activity was occuring.
The Affidavit does cite an instance of Mr. Pommier smelling
a "strong, chemical smell" while near the premises, and that on
another date (unspecified) he'd smelled that odor.

The affidavit

itself cites (Affidavit, p.5) that the house is "surrounded by an
orchard".

No evidence is shown that Mr. Pommier had any

expertise to distinguish normal pesticide smells from P-2-P, nor
even that when he smelled the odors that he thought they were
illicit.
To support this on-going criminal activity theory, the State
cites several sister-state cases.

None deal with a case of

chemicals and equipment being seen in a dormant state for a
lengthy period of time.

State v. King, 752 P.2d 869 (Or. App.

1988), deals with a "large scale, on-going drug operation"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 16) which implies widespread sales and
activities, unlike our situation, which is possession of items
legal in themselves.

There are no sales in the case at bar.

U.S. v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) dealt with a sizable
cultivation of marijuana.

Cultivation is by its nature a long-

term, on-going activity.

There is no cultivation in the case at

bar-

State v. Garcia, 566 P.2d 426 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) deals

with sales.

In that case there was evidence of a daily habit,

and numerous visits.

In State v. Torrez, 544 P.2d 207 (Ariz.

1975), numerous sales were shown within a period 30 days before.
There are no sales activities in the case at bar.

Finally, in

State v. Austria, 524 P.2d 290 (Haw. 1974), regular gambling on
Friday, Saturday, and Sunday nights, plus the informant's
personal participation in the games, was shown to defeat the
defendant's argument a 21-day delay in the games showed lack of
an on-going activity.

No activity at all is alleged against

Appellant/Defendant in our case, except as above-stated.
Point II: EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE
SUPPRESSED BASED ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING
PARTY WAS A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A
WAY AS TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT
The State reminds us of the many times Mr. Pommier protests
that he entered the garage merely out of "curiosity" (S 93, 106,
107, 113, 135; Trial Transcript 346, 354, and 355).

Obviously,

"curiosity" is a convenient pocket in which many mixed motives
are sometimes carried, and the term as employed is more of an
excuse than an explanation.

The testimony offered many obvious

conclusions as to the reasons for Mr. Pommier's entries over a
one-year period prior to reporting his observations to
authorities:

preserving surreptitious opportunities, observing a

water leak (first entry), leverage against Appellant, and
conducting an investigation.

Mr. Pommier testified that one

reason he made a key was to further investigate (S 113). This
investigation went on for almost a full year (S 92, S 95), and

ended with a report to the police.

He admits as Fire Marshal he

had duties to inspect both commercial and residential (S 134: Q:
So part of the job of a Fire Marshal and/or the Assistant Fire
Marshal, his stated duties are the inspection of homes and
businesses, true?

A:

There's actually no stated duties that

I've ever seen written up, but that's my interpretation of it.")
A very telling point is that if Mr. Pommier had been surprized in
one of his inspections, can there be any doubt that one of the
things he would've told Defendant is, after pointing to his
police radio and beeper, that he was inspecting for fire and
caustic chemical hazards in his capacity as Assistant Fire
Marshal?
The test in State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), was
(1) the government's knowledge of or acquiescence in the
intrusive conduct, and (2) the intent and purpose of the person
conducting the search.

As for the first prong, Mr. Pommier had

worked with the police a lot of times when they were on scene for
traffic control and fires (S 117), had been the Assistant Fire
Marshal for periods during his work at Appellant/Defendant's
house (S 100), often carried a police radio to work, and wore a
beeper (S 98, 99). In fact, during the actual search of
Defendant's house, Mr. Pommier was present acting in the paid (S
127) capacity of Fire Chief (S 124), in charge of the Fire
Department involvement (S 125). On that occasion, it was
undeniable he was physically present as a government agent, and
his presence then symbolized the crowning result of his earlier

intrusions.

As for the second prong, one reason he made the key,

he admitted, was to further investigate (S 113).
To deny he was a government agent here opens the door for
every officer, when he knows he is afoul of the Fourth Amendment,
to merely plead the unseemly, that he was acting ultra vires, or
was on break when he did the offending act.

Constitutional

rights should not be dispensed with as easily as the agent
changing his hat.
The State attempts to defuse the unseemliness of the State
using Mr. Pommier's break-ins, by attacking the case of State v.
Louden, 387 P.2d 240 (Utah 1963), cited by Appellant for
proposition that the court has supervisory authority over the
officers and parties before it, which should be exercised where
the sense of justice and constitutional rights of due process are
involved.

Defendant asks that the court should disallow evidence

obtained illegally.

True, Louden was vacated by the U.S. Supreme

Court in 1964, on another point (whether a hotel clerk had
authority to consent to a room search on behalf of a hotel
guest), but Louden was cited approvingly in the 1978 case of
.State v. Adams, 583 P.2d 89 (Utah, 1978), for the proposition
involved in the case at bar (at 91):
"The means by which the trial court discharges its
responsibility of seeing that justice is done may vary
according to the circumstances of the particular case and
rests largely within its discretion."
The State should not support Mr. Pommier's series of what
are either improper State investigations, or break-ins.

Point III: THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY
TO PROVE HIS DEFENSES.
It seems little enough to ask that the Government retain
either samples of the chemicals found at the premises, or test
those which it chooses to destroy.

Detective Yeates had

testified there were 80 to 100 chemicals at the home.

(S 15).

Photographs were received, over defense objection, into evidence
(Trial Transcript pp. 83, 84, 85) showing a large number of items
of jugs and jars and bottles.

On that basis, doubtless the jury

concluded this was a case of massive drug manufacture.
samples of the drugs could've been easily preserved.

Small
Surely a

small vial of each chemical would not have filled more than a few
shoeboxes, and the danger of storage wouldfve been de minimis.
Probably these samples and their itemization could've been done
is just a few hours work.

If the State declined to store any one

chemical deemed especially dangerous, it could've sampled that
one, and stored in small vials the innocuous others.

Some of the

chemicals were still in their original shipping containers (S
25), and doubtless posed no more danger in storage than they did
in public shipping.
The jury, faced with tests having been done on a few samples
only, and many of those tests having been incriminating, was not
allowed to focus on the vast number of indisputably legal
chemicals.

The destruction of a vast bulk of chemicals implied

to the jury that what they tested was merely the tip of the
iceberg.

The destruction deprived Defendant of the right to

demonstrate test results showing chemicals completely consistent

and possibly exclusively useful for such things as his production
of fertilizer, materials to change p.h. of the soil (Trial
transcript, hereinafter "R2" vol. 2, p. 500), and plant growth
hormone (R2 495). This ability, and these negative inferences,
were vital to the issue of guilt or innocence.
Instead, the State selectively took samples from what it
thought most useful in its case, and undoubtedly considered from
its long drug enforcement experience what would be most harmful
to its prosecution.

The State did not simply allow evidence to

be lost by neglect or age.

The State affirmatively destroyed it.

In any event, the allowing into evidence of photographs and other
evidence of the vast bulk without saving samples or testing, to
prove the bulk of the chemicals were completely innocent, was
unduly and vitally prejudicial to Defendant.
Points IV and V: THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERRING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AND IS A DEPRIVATION OF
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF PROSCRIBED
CONDUCT.
The Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d
683 (Utah 1977), expressly held it an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to delegate to the State Attorney General
the power to schedule as a controlled substance a drug not listed
in the legislative enactment.

This was the second part of the

Gal lion decision, the first part dealing with separation of
powers concerns.
at 690:

Concerning this second part, the Court stated,

"A determination of the elements of a crime and the
appropriate punishment therefore are, under our
Constitutional system, judgments, which must be made
exclusively by the legislature."
The only difference between Gal lion and our case is that the
drug is not Demerol, but P-2-P, and that the Attorney General is
the U.S. Attorney General, but the underlying rationale and ratio
decendis are the same.

The same constitutional problem with the

same type of statute survives into the new law.
By the Gal lion decision, the Supreme Court placed Utah in a
group of states whose highest courts have found their state's
enactment of the Controlled Substance Law unconstitutional.
Further, the decision, as may be applied to incorporation of
federal statutes, is in accord with a very respectable line of
cases holding that adoption of prospective federal legislation or
federal administrative rules constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of state legislative powers, especially where the
delegation is in futuro, .ad infinitum. These cases are adequately
dealt with in the Appellant's Brief, and not seriously questioned
by the State.
The State reminds us that statutes have a presumption of
validity, and that the burden is on the challenging party.

The

State cites Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah
1984).
lf

Algom states, at 190, that:

An analysis of the constitutionality of Sec. 59-5-4.5 must
begin with the proposition that acts of the Legislature are
presumed constitutional, especially when dealing with
economic matters based on factual assumptions." (Citations.)

The presumption admits of degrees, then.

The case at bar

does not deal with "economic matters based on factual
assumptions", as did Algom, which analyzed tax matters, so a
lesser degree is warranted here.
The State argues that it is "impracticable" for the Utah
Legislature to make its own findings as to which substances
should be controlled.

Doubtless it is more convenient for the

Legislature to abdicate these decisions to the federal
government, but that does not dispense with the argument that it
is unconstituional.

Nor does the fact that Gal lion is 12 years

old deprive it of its force.

The court can hardly take judicial

notice that all "explosion" in the development of the drug
industry was post-Gallion (1977), as the State urges us.
Furthermore, it is the illicit drug industry we are concerned
with, not the regulation and approval of all drugs.
Is it impracticable?

Cannot the legislature review the

federal regulations just put into effect, say, once a year, and
prohibit those drugs it agrees should be controlled?

This would

not entail great expense, yet it would preserve the prerogative
of the Utah voters in having their own legislative
representatives be the ones to make their criminal laws.

Cannot

the legislature itself appoint a standing committee, or create a
legislative entity under its control, to monitor developments?
Citing three federal cases, the State reminds us that there
is ample federal authority for the delegation by the federal
congress to U.S. Attorney General.

However, this misses the

point entirely, since federal delegation to federal government

misses the entire federalism problem raised by a state
legislature delegating to a federal official.

This federal

authority, in any event, even if it dealt with state delegation,
would not overturn Gal lion.
Now, for the first time in this case, in its brief on appeal
(pp. 27, 31, and 32), the State apparently alleges, though not
without confusion, that the possession of P-2-P, as a precursor,
was an illegal drug under Utah law alone, without reference to
federal law.

The argument starts that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-

2(4) (Supp. 1988), in pertinent part, defines "as used in this
chapter", the term "controlled subtance" "means a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules I, II,
III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug,
substance or immediate precursor included in Schedules I, II,
III, IV or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act...as those
schedules may be revised to add..."
Presumably, the State infers that because the words
"immediate precursor" were used in the statute above, that, if P2-P were in chemical fact an immediate precursor, that it is
thereby included, or that a reasonable man is put on notice that
P-2-P was being proscribed by the mere reference to "immediate
precursor."

First, the obvious meaning of the statute does not

include all possible generic "immediate prescursors", no more
than it does all possible "substance" or "drug", but only those
specified, i.e. only those immediate precursors "included in
schedules I, II, III, IV or V of Section 58-37-4...".

That is,

it includes only named immediate precursors.

P-2-P is not named

in the Utah Act.
The State's argument also misses Sec. 58-37-2(16):
"'Immediate precursor' means a substance which the
Attorney General of the Unitd States has found to be, and by
regulation designated as being, the principal compound used
or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a
controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical
intermediary used or likly to be used in the manufacture of
a controlled subtance, the control of which is necessary to
prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled
substance."
In short, "immediate precursor" cannot be determined without
delegation to federal laws, in futuro ad infinitum.

Without

reference to federal law, there is no State "immediate
precursor".

Therefore, the use of the word "immediate precursor"

in 58-37-2 can't put anyone on notice a particular substance is a
proscribed precursor, without that person having to search the
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations.

Immediate

precursors cannot be found, where not scheduled by name
explicitly, to be proscribed by State law only in 58-37-2, since
the phrase itself finds its definition in the federal lists.
The State would convince us that Defendant violated Section
58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B). Those sections read:
"(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall consist of
the following drugs or other substances, by whatever
official name, common or usual name, chemical name or brand
name designated:
(b) Schedule II:
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or
preparation which contains any quantity of the following
substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous
system:
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts
of its optical isomers

(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of
its isomers"
Nothing here states a precursor is a salt, isomer, or salt
of its isomer.

Counsel knows of no evidence or issue put on at

trial that P-2-P was a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, or
amphetamine or methamphetamine.
What is clear is that the case went to the jury on
instructions, not that they were to determine if P-2-P was a
precursor, or a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, but simply that
it was a controlled substance.

Instruction SA-2 provided, in

part, the elements the prosecution had to prove were as follows:
"1. That on or about 1987 or 1988, in Box Elder
County, State of Utah;
2. That the Defendant did, knowingly and
intentionally;
3. Manufacture;
4. A controlled substance, to-wit, P-2-P."
Instructions 3 and 4 are to the same effect, the difference
being merely between possession vs. manufacture.
strikingly, Instruction No. 5 states flatly:

Even more

"You are instructed

that Phenyl-2-Propanone or P2P is a controlled substance under
the laws of the State of Utah."

Defendant was not tried on

manufacture of a "salt", nor of a "precursor".
In short, Gal,..lion prohibits this statutory delegation
expressly.

Nothing in the State statutes, without reference to

the delegation to the federal, prohibit P-2-P, nor was the case
tried or submitted on a "precursor" nor "salt" theory.

There is

no reasonable basis on which the GalljLon result can be avoided.

The delegation to the U.S. Attorney General is especially onerous
as to precursors, due to the fact that the Attorney General's
findings requirement, and medical and scientific evaluations,
can, as for precursors, be dispensed with altogether. (21 USCA
811(e)).
Point VI: THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY
INSTRUCTION THAT THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE
PROPRIETY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TOBE-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
Gallion, at 689, allows a Defendant the right to "challenge
the administrative procedure and the findings where a substance
has been scheduled or rescheduled".

Defendant asked for

Instruction 1 to comply with that, and it was refused.
was made, and preserved.

Objection

This is reversible error, in that, had

the instruction been given, since the State had not offered
testimony showing compliance by the U.S. Attorney General, the
jury would've had to conclude P-2-P was not a controlled
substance, and acquitted.

Defendant raised the GaJHjDn/federal

delegation issue generally, at pre-trial (Trial Transcript, Vol.
1, 30-45), and at the end of the State's evidence, when Defendant
moved for directed verdict (R2 425), but Gal lion-concerned
motions were denied (Trial Transcript vol. 1 p. 45, R2 431-3).
At Trial Transcript Vol. 1, page 39, counsel for Defendant makes
an express issue of the State having to prove administrative
compliance, just before the jury was empanelled.

He said, "You

also get into a vast complex area here with regard to proof,
issues of proof, what they have to prove.

Presumably the State

here is going to have to prove that the U.S.--United States

Attorney General properly exercised the authority, held the
proper hearings, properly issued, promulgated, did everthing
needed to in order to get it into the Federal Regulations, into
the Code of Federal Regulations as they're accepted by Congress."
Gal lion states this right, which was raised in the instructions.
By this pre-trial statement, the State was put on notice of its
challenge, but chose not to meet it.

The prosecution failed to

establish the element of compliance with the federal enactment.
CONCLUSION
The matters raised herein are in response to certain matters
raised in the Respondent's Brief, and do not waive nor diminish
those points argued in the Appellant's Brief.

It is respectfully

submitted that evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant
was obtained by illegal search and siezure, based on insufficient
probable cause, that the evidence should be suppressed based on
illegal search and siezure by a government agent, or one who
should be treated as such, that the destruction of evidence was a
deprivation of due process, that the authority given the U.S.
Attorney General to schedule and change schedules of drugs was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and failed to
give notice of proscribed conduct, and that the denial of a jury
instruction that the State must prove propu££ federal^ enactment
was reversible error.
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